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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 On January 12, 2015, Heather Oberdorf returned home 
from work, put a retractable leash on her dog, and took the 
dog for a walk.  Unexpectedly, the dog lunged, causing the D-
ring on the collar to break and the leash to recoil back and hit 
Oberdorf’s face and eyeglasses.  As a result, Oberdorf is 
permanently blind in her left eye.   
 
 Oberdorf bought the collar on Amazon.com.  As a 
result of the accident, she sued Amazon.com, including 
claims for strict products liability and negligence.  The 
District Court found that, under Pennsylvania law, Amazon 
was not liable for Oberdorf’s injuries.  In its opinion, the 
District Court emphasized that a third-party vendor—rather 
than Amazon itself—listed the collar on Amazon’s online 
marketplace and shipped the collar directly to Oberdorf.  
Those facts were the basis for the District Court’s two main 
rulings. 
 
 First, the District Court found that Amazon is not 
subject to strict products liability claims because Amazon is 
not a “seller” under Pennsylvania law.  Second, the District 
Court found that Oberdorf’s claims are barred by the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) because she seeks to 
hold Amazon liable for its role as the online publisher of 
third-party content.     
 
I 
 
 Both issues in this case pertain to Amazon’s role in 
effectuating the sale of products offered by third-party 
vendors.  Therefore, we begin by describing the anatomy of a 
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sale on Amazon.com.1 
 
   Amazon Marketplace 
 
 Amazon is the world’s most valuable retail company.2  
Its website is an online marketplace where Amazon retails its 
own products as well as those of more than one million third-
party vendors.3  These third-party vendors decide which 
products to sell, the means of shipping, and product pricing.  
For its part, Amazon lists the products on the Amazon 
Marketplace, collects order information from consumers, and 
processes payments.  In exchange for these services, Amazon 
collects fees from each third-party vendor. 
 
 In order to use Amazon’s services, a third-party vendor 
must assent to Amazon’s Services Business Solutions 
Agreement.  This Agreement governs every step of the sales 
process.   
 
 Once a third-party vendor has assented to the 
Agreement, the vendor chooses which product or products it 
                                                 
1 Throughout this opinion, we use the more complete 
company name, “Amazon.com,” to refer to Amazon’s 
website, but use the shorter name, “Amazon” to refer to the 
company itself. 
2 David Streitfeld, Amazon Is Now Second to Cross $1 
Trillion Line, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2018, at B1. 
3 To remain consistent throughout this opinion, and to avoid 
using the term “seller,” which has legal significance under 
Pennsylvania strict products liability law, we refer to the third 
parties who offer products on Amazon.com as “third-party 
vendors” or “vendors.” 
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would like to sell using Amazon’s website.  This choice is, 
with some notable exceptions, left to the discretion of the 
vendor.  Among the exceptions are products that Amazon 
determines are illegal, sexually explicit, defamatory, or 
obscene.   
 
 When the third-party vendor has chosen a product that 
it wants to offer on Amazon’s website, the vendor provides 
Amazon with a description of the product, including its brand, 
model, dimensions, and weight.  Pursuant to the Agreement, 
the vendor must also provide Amazon with digital images of 
the product, as well as other information such as shipping and 
handling options, product availability, in-stock status, and any 
other information reasonably requested by Amazon. 
 
 Based on this information, Amazon formats the 
product’s listing on its website.  This function, too, is 
provided for in the Agreement, by which Amazon retains the 
right in its sole discretion to determine the content, 
appearance, design, functionality, and all other aspects of the 
Services, including by redesigning, modifying, removing, or 
restricting access to any of them.  In fact, the Agreement 
grants Amazon a royalty-free, non-exclusive, worldwide, 
perpetual, irrevocable right and license to commercially or 
non-commercially exploit in any manner, the information 
provided by third-party vendors. 
 
 The third-party vendor can then choose which, if any, 
of Amazon’s other services it will use in conjunction with 
listing its product on Amazon’s website.  For example, 
Amazon offers “Amazon Clicks,” an advertising service in 
which Amazon highlights and promotes the vendor’s product 
to customers.  Amazon also offers a “Fulfillment by Amazon” 
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service, in which it takes physical possession of third-party 
vendors’ products and ships those products to consumers.  
Otherwise, the vendor itself is responsible for shipping 
products directly to consumers.   
 
 The listed price for the product is chosen by the third-
party vendor, subject to one exception:  Vendors may not 
charge more on Amazon than they charge in other sales 
channels.  Nor, according to the Agreement, may third-party 
vendors offer inferior customer service or provide lower 
quality information about products than in other sales 
channels.  To the extent that third-party vendors need to 
communicate with customers regarding their orders on 
Amazon, they must do so through the Amazon platform.   
 
 With these preliminaries completed, Amazon lists the 
product online and sales begin.  As customers make 
purchases on Amazon’s website, Amazon collects payment 
and delivers order information to the third-party vendor.  At 
checkout, the customer can choose any shipping method 
offered by the third-party vendor, and any promises made by 
the vendor with respect to shipping date must be met.  
Amazon ensures compliance with this obligation by requiring 
the vendor to send Amazon shipping information for each 
order.  In addition, vendors have a powerful interest in 
providing quality products and ensuring timely delivery, as 
Amazon allows shoppers to publicly rate the vendors and 
their products.   
 
 In exchange for its role in the transaction, Amazon 
collects two types of fees:  one is a commission, typically 
between seven and fifteen percent of the overall sales price; 
the other is either a per-item or monthly fee, depending on the 
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third-party vendor’s preference.  At least once every two 
weeks, Amazon remits all sales proceeds, minus fees, to the 
vendor.  Pursuant to the Agreement, Amazon is classified as 
the third-party vendor’s “agent for purposes of processing 
payments, refunds, and adjustments . . . receiving and holding 
Sales Proceeds on your behalf, remitting Sales Proceeds to 
Your Bank Account, charging your Credit Card, and paying 
Amazon and its Affiliates amounts you owe . . ..”4 
 
 Throughout each step of the sales process, Amazon 
may at any time cease providing any or all of the Services at 
its sole discretion and without notice, including suspending, 
prohibiting, or removing any listing.  Amazon also retains 
other important privileges.  For example, Amazon can require 
vendors to stop or cancel orders of any product.  If Amazon 
determines that a vendor’s actions or performance may result 
in risks to Amazon or third parties, it may in its sole 
discretion withhold any payments to the vendor.  
Furthermore, Amazon requires that its vendors release it and 
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold it harmless against any 
claim, loss, damage, settlement, cost, expense, or other 
liability.   
 
 The Dog Collar 
 
 On December 2, 2014, Heather Oberdorf logged onto 
Amazon’s website.  She typed search information for dog 
collars into Amazon’s search terms box.  She decided to 
purchase the dog collar at issue, which was sold by a third-
party vendor, “The Furry Gang.”  The Furry Gang shipped 
the dog collar directly from Nevada to Oberdorf, who put the 
                                                 
4 JA195. 
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collar on her dog, Sadie.  Then, on January 12, 2015, while 
Oberdorf was walking Sadie, the D-ring on the collar broke 
and the retractable leash recoiled into Oberdorf’s eyeglasses, 
injuring her and permanently blinding her in her left eye.   
 
 Neither Amazon nor Oberderf has been able to locate a 
representative of The Furry Gang, which has not had an 
active account on Amazon.com since May 2016.   
 
 Procedural History 
 
 Oberdorf filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, bringing 
claims for strict product liability, negligence, breach of 
warranty, misrepresentation, and loss of consortium.5  
Oberdorf propounds two separate theories of strict product 
liability:  (1) failure to provide adequate warnings regarding 
the use of the dog collar, and (2) defective design of the dog 
collar.  She also asserts a variety of negligence theories, 
namely that Amazon was negligent in (1) distributing, 
inspecting, marketing, selling, and testing of the dog collar in 
an unreasonable manner; (2) allowing the dog collar to enter 
the stream of commerce in a dangerous condition; (3) failing 
to conduct a proper hazard analysis; (4) failing to follow the 
guidelines of the “safety hierarchy”; and (5) failing to provide 
the product with features, elements, precautions, or warnings 
that would have made it safer.   
 
 The District Court granted Amazon’s motion for 
                                                 
5 The breach of warranty and misrepresentation claims and 
Michael Oberdorf’s loss of consortium claim are not relevant 
to the present appeal. 
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summary judgment, finding that (1) Amazon cannot be sued 
under Pennsylvania’s strict products liability law because it 
does not constitute a “seller” within the meaning of 
Pennsylvania strict liability law, and (2) Oberdorf’s claims 
are barred by the CDA because she seeks to hold Amazon 
liable for its role as the online publisher of a third party’s 
content. 
 
II 
 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Because our review of a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment is plenary, we affirm only where “there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6  In determining 
whether summary judgment is appropriate, we view all facts 
and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, in this case, the Oberdorfs.7   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  “An issue is 
genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which 
a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a 
factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome 
of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. County of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
7 Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266–67 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
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III 
 
 We begin our analysis by addressing Amazon’s 
contention that it is not subject to Oberdorf’s strict products 
liability claims. 
 
 Because our subject matter jurisdiction stems from the 
parties’ diverse citizenship, we apply Pennsylvania law in 
deciding whether the District Court properly dismissed 
Oberdorf’s strict products liability claim.8  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has made clear that the Second Restatement 
of Torts § 402A applies to Pennsylvania strict products 
liability claims.9  Section 402A specifically limits strict 
products liability to “sellers” of products.10  Amazon relies on 
this limitation as its defense, claiming that it is not a “seller” 
because it merely provides an online marketplace for products 
sold by third-party vendors.  We disagree.11 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
9 Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966). 
10 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Am. Law. Inst. 
1965) (an actor can only be subject to strict liability for 
selling a defective product if he is a “seller . . . engaged in the 
business of selling such a product”). 
11 Our decision, guided by Pennsylvania law, is limited to the 
question of whether Amazon is a “seller” based on its role in 
effectuating sales of physical products offered by third-party 
vendors.  We express no view, for example, on whether other 
companies providing online marketplaces are considered 
“sellers.”      
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A 
 
 Amazon relies heavily on the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decision in Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co, Inc.12 to 
support its contention that it is not a “seller.”  Although 
Musser is a significant case to which we look for guidance, it 
does not command the result that Amazon seeks. 
 
The plaintiff in Musser was injured by a tractor that his 
father had bought at an auction house.  Following his injury, 
he sought to hold the auction house strictly liable as a “seller” 
of the allegedly defective tractor.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that the auction house could not be considered a 
“seller,” and thus that the plaintiff must prove that the auction 
house acted unreasonably (i.e., bring a negligence claim) in 
order to hold it liable.13  In making this ruling, the court relied 
on the policy rationale articulated in comment f of § 402A of 
the Second Restatement of Torts: 
 
The basis of the rule is the ancient 
one of the special responsibility 
for the safety of the public 
undertaken by one who enters into 
the business of supplying human 
beings with products which may 
endanger the safety of their 
persons and property, and the 
forced reliance upon that 
undertaking on the part of those 
who purchase such goods.  This 
                                                 
12 562 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1989). 
13 Id. at 282-83. 
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basis is lacking in the case of the 
ordinary individual who makes 
the isolated sale, and he is not 
liable to a third person or even to 
his buyer in the absence of his 
negligence.14 
 The court noted that, when the above policy rationale 
“will not be served, persons whose implication in supplying 
products is tangential to that undertaking will not be subjected 
to strict liability for the harms caused by defects in the 
products.”15  Therefore, because “[t]he auction company 
merely provided a market as the agent of the seller,” the court 
concluded that applying strict liability doctrine to the auction 
house would not further the doctrine’s underlying policy 
justification.16 
 
 In its opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made 
clear that courts later tasked with determining whether an 
actor is a “seller” should consider whether the following four 
factors apply: 
 
(1) Whether the actor is the “only member of the 
marketing chain available to the injured plaintiff 
for redress”;  
(2) Whether “imposition of strict liability upon the 
[actor] serves as an incentive to safety”;  
                                                 
14 Id. at 281 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
cmt. f). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 282. 
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(3) Whether the actor is “in a better position than the 
consumer to prevent the circulation of defective 
products”; and  
(4) Whether “[t]he [actor] can distribute the cost of 
compensating for injuries resulting from defects by 
charging for it in his business, i.e., by adjustment of 
the rental terms.”17 
  We consider below each of the four factors articulated 
in Musser. 
 
1 
 
The first factor is whether Amazon “may be the only 
member of the marketing chain available to the injured 
plaintiff for redress.”18  In Musser, the court found that this 
factor failed to support a finding that the auction house was a 
“seller” because in an auction there is a vendor, for whom the 
auctioneer is the agent and who may be amenable to suit 
under § 402A for negligence or breach of warranty.19  In other 
words, the plaintiff in Musser could sue the other parties in 
the sales distribution chain. 
                                                 
17 Id. (citations omitted).  Note that the four-factor test 
articulated in Musser was applied earlier in the context of 
determining whether a lessor should be considered a “seller” 
for purposes of § 402A.  See Nath v. Nat’l Equip. Leasing 
Corp., 439 A.2d 633, 635-36 (Pa. 1981); Francioni v. 
Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736, 739 (Pa. 1977).  
However, Musser represents the court’s first use of the test 
outside of that context.   
18 Musser, 562 A.2d at 282.   
19 Id.  
14 
 
Amazon contends that, just as every item offered at an 
auction house can be traced to a seller who may be amenable 
to suit, every item on Amazon’s website can be traced to a 
third-party vendor.  However, Amazon fails to account for the 
fact that under the Agreement, third-party vendors can 
communicate with the customer only through Amazon.  This 
enables third-party vendors to conceal themselves from the 
customer, leaving customers injured by defective products 
with no direct recourse to the third-party vendor. There are 
numerous cases in which neither Amazon nor the party 
injured by a defective product, sold by Amazon.com, were 
able to locate the product’s third-party vendor or 
manufacturer.20   
 
In this case, Amazon’s Vice President of Marketing 
Business admitted that Amazon generally takes no 
precautions to ensure that third-party vendors are in good 
standing under the laws of the country in which their business 
is registered.  In addition, Amazon had no vetting process in 
place to ensure, for example, that third-party vendors were 
amenable to legal process.  After Oberdorf was injured by the 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 17-cv-
2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) 
(“Neither Plaintiff nor [Amazon] is aware who manufactured 
the laptop battery . . ..”); Fox v. Amazon.com, 16-cv-3013, 
2018 WL 2431628, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018) (“[T]he 
manufacturer of the hoverboard at issue is unknown.”) appeal 
filed No. 18-5661, 2018 WL 2431628 (6th Cir. June 25, 
2018); Stiner v. Amazon, 15-cv-185837, 2017 WL 9751163, 
at *7 (Ohio. Com. Pl. Sept. 20, 2017) (Dkt. No. 120-1) (“[The 
manufacturer] is a Chinese company and not subject to 
process and [the third-party vendor] is insolvent.”). 
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defective collar, neither she nor Amazon was able to locate 
The Furry Gang.  As a result, Amazon now stands as the only 
member of the marketing chain available to the injured 
plaintiff for redress. 
 
The first factor weighs in favor of imposing strict 
liability on Amazon.21 
 
2 
 The second factor we consider is whether “imposition 
of strict liability upon the [actor would] serve[] as an 
incentive to safety.”22  In Musser, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court “fail[ed] to see how the imposition of strict liability [on 
the auction house] would be more than a futile gesture in 
promoting the manufacture and distribution of safer 
products,” chiefly because the auction house was “not in the 
business of designing and/or manufacturing any particular 
                                                 
21 The dissent concludes that the first factor weighs in favor 
of Amazon because “[t]o assign liability for no reason other 
than the ability to pay damages is inconsistent with our 
jurisprudence.”  Cafazzo, 668 A.2d at 526.  This contention 
overlooks the extensive record evidence that Amazon fails to 
vet third-party vendors for amenability to legal process.  The 
first factor weighs in favor of strict liability not because The 
Furry Gang cannot be located and/or may be insolvent, but 
rather because Amazon enables third-party vendors such as 
The Furry Gang to structure and/or conceal themselves from 
liability altogether.  As a result, Amazon remains “the only 
member of the marketing chain available to the injured 
plaintiff for redress.”  Musser, 562 A.2d at 281. 
22 Musser, 562 A.2d at 282.   
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product or products.”23  Amazon asserts that it does not have 
a relationship with the designers or manufacturers of products 
offered by third-party vendors.  Therefore, it contends that 
imposing strict liability would not be an incentive for safer 
products.  Again, we disagree with Amazon.   
 
Although Amazon does not have direct influence over 
the design and manufacture of third-party products, Amazon 
exerts substantial control over third-party vendors.  Third-
party vendors have signed on to Amazon’s Agreement, which 
grants Amazon “the right in [its] sole discretion to . . . 
suspend[], prohibit[], or remov[e] any [product] listing,”24 
“withhold any payments” to third-party vendors,25 “impose 
transaction limits,”26 and “terminate or suspend . . . any 
Service [to a third-party-vendor] for any reason at any 
time.”27  Therefore, Amazon is fully capable, in its sole 
discretion, of removing unsafe products from its website.  
Imposing strict liability upon Amazon would be an incentive 
to do so. 
 
The second factor favors imposing strict liability on 
Amazon.28 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 JA168. 
25 JA150. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 The dissent contends that holding Amazon strictly liable for 
defective products will require them to “enter a 
fundamentally new business model” because “the company 
does not undertake to curate its selection of products, nor 
generally to police them for dangerousness.”  Dissent at 21-
17 
 
3 
 
 The third factor we consider is whether Amazon is “in 
a better position than the consumer to prevent the circulation 
of defective products.”29 
 
In Musser, the court indicated that the auctioneer was 
not in a better position than the consumer to prevent the 
circulation of defective products because it lacked an 
“ongoing relationship with the manufacturer from which 
some financial advantage inures to [its] benefit . . ..”30  
Similarly, in Nath v. National Equipment Leasing Corp.,31 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, because financing 
agencies perform only a “tangential” role in the sales process, 
“their relationship with a particular manufacturer does not, in 
the normal course, possess the continuity of transactions that 
would provide a basis for indirect influence over the 
condition and the safety of the product.”32  Here, while 
Amazon may at times lack continuous relationships with a 
third-party vendor, the potential for continuing sales 
encourages an on-going relationship between Amazon and the 
third-party vendors.   
                                                                                                             
22.  We do not believe that Pennsylvania law shields a 
company from strict liability simply because it adheres to a 
business model that fails to prioritize consumer safety.  The 
dissent’s reasoning would give an incentive to companies to 
design business models, like that of Amazon, that do nothing 
to protect consumers from defective products. 
29 Musser, 562 A.2d at 282. 
30 Id.  
31 439 A.2d 633 (Pa. 1981). 
32 Id. at 636. 
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Moreover, Amazon is uniquely positioned to receive 
reports of defective products, which in turn can lead to such 
products being removed from circulation.  Amazon’s website, 
which Amazon in its sole discretion has the right to manage, 
serves as the public-facing forum for products listed by third-
party vendors.  In its contract with third-party vendors, 
Amazon already retains the ability to collect customer 
feedback:  “We may use mechanisms that rate, or allow 
shoppers to rate, Your Products and your performance as a 
seller and Amazon may make these ratings and feedback 
publicly available.”33  Third-party vendors, on the other hand, 
are ill-equipped to fulfill this function, because Amazon 
specifically curtails the channels that third-party vendors may 
use to communicate with customers:  “[Y]ou may only use 
tools and methods that we designate to communicate with 
Amazon site users regarding Your Transactions . . ..”34   
   
The third factor also weighs in favor of imposing strict 
liability on Amazon.35  
                                                 
33 JA163. 
34 JA154. 
35 Musser, 562 A.2d at 282.  The dissent contends that 
Amazon is no better-positioned than the consumer to 
encourage the safety of products sold in the Amazon 
Marketplace.   However, the dissent openly acknowledges at 
least one aspect of Amazon’s relationship with third-party 
sellers that demonstrates Amazon’s powerful position relative 
to the consumer:  Amazon “reserves the right to eject sellers.”  
Dissent at 21.  Imposing strict liability on Amazon will ensure 
that the company uses this relative position of power to eject 
sellers who have been determined to be selling defective 
goods.      
19 
 
4 
 
 The fourth factor we consider is whether Amazon can 
distribute the cost of compensating for injuries resulting from 
defects.   
 
In Musser, the court “acknowledge[d] that it would be 
possible for the auctioneer to pass on the costs of imposing 
strict liability upon him; possibly as [the injured plaintiff] 
suggests, by indemnity agreements between the auctioneer 
and the seller.”36  However, although the court found that 
extending the meaning of “seller” to include the auctioneer 
would provide another remedy for injured customers, the 
court demurred, stating that this would “only marginally” 
promote the “purpose of the policy considerations” 
underlying § 402A.37    
 
In this case, however, Amazon has already provided 
for indemnification by virtue of a provision in the Agreement:   
 
You release us and agree to 
indemnify, defend, and hold 
harmless us, our Affiliates, and 
our and their respective officers, 
directors, employees, 
representatives, and agents against 
any claim, loss, damage, 
settlement, cost, expense, or other 
liability (including, without 
                                                 
36 Musser, 562 A.2d at 283. 
37 Id. 
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limitation, attorneys’ fees) . . ..38   
 
Moreover, Amazon can adjust the commission-based 
fees that it charges to third-party vendors based on the risk 
that the third-party vendor presents.     
 
Amazon’s customers are particularly vulnerable in 
situations like the present case.  Neither the Oberdorfs nor 
Amazon has been able to locate the third-party vendor, The 
Furry Gang.  Conversely, had there been an incentive for 
Amazon to keep track of its third-party vendors, it might have 
done so.  
 
The fourth factor also weighs in favor of imposing 
strict liability on Amazon.  Thus, although the four-factor test 
yielded a different result when applied by the Musser court to 
an auction house, all four factors in this case weigh in favor 
of imposing strict liability on Amazon.39 
 
 
                                                 
38 JA267. 
39 The dissent contends that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cafazzo upended the Commonwealth’s 
well-established four-factor analysis, thereby rendering the 
Francioni factors secondary to a threshold question of 
whether a particular defendant is a supplier/seller of the 
product.  Cafazzo v. Cent. Med. Health. Servs., Inc., 668 A.2d 
521, 525 (Pa. 1995).  However, even if we were to assume 
that Cafazzo created a threshold issue of whether Amazon is a 
seller, we believe, as detailed below, that under Pennsylvania 
law, Amazon is in fact a seller, and thus we must proceed to 
the Francioni factors. 
21 
 
B 
 
 We do not rely exclusively upon the four-factor test to 
reach our conclusion that Amazon is subject to strict products 
liability claims for sales involving third-party vendors.  Our 
reasoning is consistent with that in other Pennsylvania cases.   
 
 Notably, in Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc.,40 the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court decided that a sales agent was a 
“seller” under § 402A, and thus subject to strict product 
liability under Pennsylvania law.41  Although Hoffman 
predates Musser, its holding remains valid, as neither Musser 
nor any subsequent decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has called Hoffman’s holding into question.42  
Moreover, Hoffman addresses Amazon’s main argument:  
Amazon claims that it cannot be considered a “seller” because 
it does not take title to or possession of the products sold by 
third-party vendors.  The court held in Hoffman that under 
Pennsylvania law a participant in the sales process can be 
held strictly liable for injuries resulting from defective 
products, even if the participant does not take title or 
possession of those products.43  
 
                                                 
40 452 A.2d 1349 (Pa. Super. 1982). 
41 Id. at 1354-55. 
42 See Wisniewski v. Johns–Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 
273–74 (3d Cir. 1985). (“Although lower state court decisions 
are not controlling on an issue on which the highest court of 
the state has not spoken, federal courts must attribute 
significant weight to these decisions in the absence of any 
indication that the highest state court would rule otherwise.”).   
43 452 A.2d at 1354-55. 
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 Hoffman involved bulk sales of linseed oil.  The 
manufacturer’s sales agent, E.W. Kaufmann Co., would 
transmit orders for linseed oil from the packager to the 
distributor.  That was Kaufmann’s only role in the sales 
process.  As part of the summary judgment briefing in 
Hoffman, Kaufmann submitted an affidavit from its principal 
executive, stating that it did not take title, possession, or 
ownership of any of the relevant linseed oil during the 
distribution or sales process.44  Nonetheless, the court made 
clear that strict liability in Pennsylvania is properly extended 
“to anyone ‘who enters into the business of supplying human 
beings with products which may endanger the safety of their 
persons and property.’”45  Because Kaufmann’s tasks 
amounted to being “in the business of selling or marketing 
merchandise,” rather than performing a “tangential” role, it 
could be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from defects 
in that merchandise.46   
 
 In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed two 
prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases, both of which also 
inform our judgment that Amazon is subject to strict liability.  
The first of these is Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp.,47 in 
                                                 
44 See id. at 1352 n.2 (citing an affidavit stating that, for all 
transactions involving the relevant packager, “title passed 
directly from [the manufacturer] to [the packager],” and that 
“[a]ny oil which [the packager] obtained from [the 
manufacturer] at the time in question was never owned by . . . 
E.W. KAUFMANN COMPANY.”). 
45 Id. at 1353 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, 
cmt. f). 
46 Id. at 1354. 
47 372 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1977). 
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which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that the term 
“seller,” as used in § 402A, does not limit strict products 
liability to the context of sales; that is to say, the term “seller” 
can also extend to lessors and bailors.  The court held that 
strict products liability should be applied broadly to those 
who market products, “whether by sale, lease or bailment, for 
use and consumption by the public.”48   
 
 Four years later, in Nath v. National Equipment 
Leasing Corp.,49 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to 
extend the application of strict product liability to financial 
lessors because the financial lessor’s “participation in the 
chain of events was tangential,” in such a way that it “was not 
able to, nor would it have been in a position to, effect or 
oversee the safety of the product.”50  The core of the court’s 
logic was that “[a] finance lessor is not in the business of 
selling or marketing merchandise,” but rather it “is in the 
business of circulating funds.”51   
 
 In this case, Amazon’s role extends beyond that of the 
Hoffman sales agent, who in exchange for a commission 
merely accepted orders and arranged for product shipments.  
Amazon not only accepts orders and arranges for product 
shipments, but it also exerts substantial market control over 
product sales by restricting product pricing, customer service, 
and communications with customers.52  Amazon’s 
involvement, in other words, resembles but also exceeds that 
                                                 
48 Id. at 738. 
49 439 A.2d 633 (Pa. 1981). 
50 Id. at 636. 
51 Id. 
52 JA111, JA114, JA154, JA166. 
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of the sales agent labeled a “seller” in Hoffman.   
 
 At oral argument, Amazon contended that it should not 
be likened to a sales agent because it lists products and 
collects payment on behalf of various third-party vendors, 
whereas a sales agent typically represents a single seller or 
manufacturer.  This is a distinction without a difference.  
Pennsylvania state courts have repeatedly found that large 
retailers who offer a range of different products are “sellers” 
within the meaning of § 402A.53  Amazon is not exempted 
from strict products liability simply because its website offers 
a variety of products.54 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Barton v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc. 124 A.3d 
349, 352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (permitting claim against 
Lowes premised on it being a “seller” to proceed past 
demurrer stage); Burch v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 467 A.2d 
615, 621, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that Sears is a 
“seller,” and reaffirming that, “under our products liability 
law, all suppliers of a defective product in the chain of 
distribution, whether retailers, partmakers, assemblers, 
owners, sellers, lessors, or any other relevant category, are 
potentially liable to the ultimate user injured by the defect.”); 
see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A,  cmt. f (“The 
rule stated in this Section applies to . . . any manufacturer of 
such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, 
and to the operator of a restaurant. It is not necessary that the 
seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such 
products. Thus the rule applies to the owner of a motion 
picture theatre who sells popcorn or ice cream, either for 
consumption on the premises or in packages to be taken 
home.”). 
54 The dissent characterizes Hoffman as a “narrow exception” 
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C 
 
 Amazon’s remaining arguments similarly fail to 
demonstrate that it is not subject to strict product liability in 
Pennsylvania. 
 
 For example, Amazon asks that we look to dictionary 
definitions of the word “seller” for support.  However, 
comment f to § 402A makes clear that the term “seller” is not 
                                                                                                             
to the general rule that a “‘seller’ in Pennsylvania is almost 
always an actor who transfers ownership from itself to the 
customer.”  Even assuming arguendo that Hoffman represents 
an “exception,” Amazon falls within said exception, which 
Pennsylvania courts have never labeled as “narrow.”  The 
dissent claims that the Hoffman exception applies only to 
“exclusive sales representatives or exclusive agents,” with 
“exclusive agents” often considered sellers because the agent 
(1) “trafficks intimately in [the products],” Bumbaugh, 152 
A.D. 2d at 72, and (2) is “bound by its exclusive sales 
representative contract to promote the sale of [the] products.”  
Bittler, 560 N.E.2d at 982.  The dissent concludes that 
because Amazon does not have any “exclusive” franchise in 
the sale of third-party products, it “clearly does not fit this 
description.”  There is one problem with the dissent’s 
description of the so-called Hoffman exception:  Nowhere in 
Hoffman does it state that the sales agent, E.W. Kaufmann 
Company, was an “exclusive” agent for the manufacturer.  To 
the contrary, E.W. Kaufmann’s ostensibly non-exclusive role 
as sales agent was nearly identical to that of Amazon:  It 
received orders for the product on behalf of a third-party 
manufacturer and transmitted the orders to be fulfilled, never 
taking any right to possession or title. 
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limited by its dictionary definition, as it “applies to any 
manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or retail 
dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant.”55  
Amazon contends that we should construe “seller” as a person 
who transfers a thing that she owns to another in exchange for 
something of value, usually money.  This concept runs 
squarely against Pennsylvania case law that does not require 
an actor to possess or hold title to an item in order to be 
considered a “seller” for purposes of § 402A.56  
 
 Amazon also relies heavily on non-controlling case 
law from jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania.  However, in 
deciding whether Amazon is a “seller” within the meaning of 
§ 402A, we must predict what the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would decide under Pennsylvania law interpreting the 
Second Restatement of Torts.57  It is of little consequence 
whether Amazon is a “seller” for purposes of other states’ 
statutes, as each of those statutory schemes is based on 
distinct language and policy considerations.58  
                                                 
55 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt. f. 
56 See e.g., Hoffman, 452 A.2d at 1349. 
57 Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 45–46 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“In the absence of a controlling decision by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a federal court applying that 
state’s substantive law must predict how Pennsylvania’s 
highest court would decide this case.”). 
58 The dissent also cites approvingly to out-of-jurisdiction 
case law determining that Amazon was not subject to strict 
liability as a “seller.”  In particular, the dissent highlights 
cases from the Fourth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Southern District 
of New York, and Northern District of Illinois, none of which 
should shape our analysis here.  See Erie Ins. Co. v. 
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Amazon.com, No. 18-1198, 2019 WL 2195146 (4th Cir. May 
22, 2019); Fox v. Amazon, No. 18-5661, 2019 WL 2417391 
(6th Cir. June 10, 2019); Eberhart v. Amazon, Inc., 325 F. 
Supp. 3d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
No. 17 C 673, 2019 WL 1437877 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2019).  
The Fourth Circuit case made clear that its holding turned in 
large part on a provision of the Maryland Uniform 
Commercial Code, which, of course, has no effect on 
Pennsylvania law.  See Erie Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2195146, at 
*4 (citing § 2-103(1)(d) of the Maryland Code of Commercial 
Law as a basis for its holding because it defines a “sale” as 
“the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price”).  
Moreover, as Judge Motz noted in her concurrence in that 
case, as a federal court sitting in diversity, “[g]iven the 
policy-intensive nature of this inquiry, the lack of on-point 
Maryland precedent, and Amazon’s novel business model,” 
one could not “confidently predict that Maryland courts 
would treat Amazon as a seller under state law.”  Id. at *7.  
The Sixth Circuit case was explicitly based on a Tennessee 
statute that applied a different test than that of § 402A of the 
Second Restatement, namely, whether an “individual [was] 
regularly engaged in exercising sufficient control over a 
product in connection with its sale.”  Fox, 2019 WL 2417391, 
at *7.  Under Pennsylvania law, on the other hand, we apply 
the Francioni factors, none of which parallel the apparently 
single-factor Tennessee test for “sufficient control.”  Id.  In 
the New York case, the federal district court noted that under 
New York law, a distributor cannot be held strictly liable for 
product defects unless it “at some point, own[ed] the 
defective product.”  Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 398.  And in 
the Illinois case, the district court noted that prior state cases 
appeared to require an “exclusivity” arrangement where an 
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 Therefore, having concluded that Amazon should be 
considered a “seller” under § 402A of the Second 
Restatement of Torts, we hold that under Pennsylvania law, 
Amazon is strictly liable for consumer injuries caused by 
defective goods purchased on Amazon.com.   
 
IV 
 
 The second issue in this appeal is whether Oberdorf’s 
claims, both for negligence and for strict liability, including 
failure to provide adequate warnings regarding the use of the 
dog collar, are barred by § 230 of the CDA.59  Unlike the first 
issue, this is a question of federal law.  We conclude that the 
CDA bars some, but not all, of Oberdorf’s claims.   
 
 The CDA states, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
                                                                                                             
alleged seller was not involved in transferring title.  Garber, 
2019 WL 1437877, at *7 (“The [plaintiffs] have not presented 
any evidence that Amazon purported to be the exclusive seller 
of Shenzhen hoverboards.”).  As noted above, in 
Pennsylvania, a party involved in the sales process need not 
own the defective product or have an exclusivity arrangement 
with the manufacturer to be strictly liable for product defects.  
See, e.g., Hoffman, 452 A.2d 1349.  Therefore, we do not 
believe these non-precedential, out-of-circuit cases should 
guide our reasoning.  Our task is strictly limited to 
determining what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do 
pursuant to Pennsylvania law. 
59 See 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
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information content provider.”60  This section, sometimes 
referred to as the CDA “safe harbor provision,”61 “precludes 
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer 
service provider in a publisher’s role, and therefore bars 
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its 
exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such 
as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter 
content.”62  The CDA is intended to allow interactive 
computer services companies “to perform some editing on 
user-generated content without thereby becoming liable for 
all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they 
didn’t edit or delete.”63  
  
The CDA safe harbor provision was passed by 
Congress in the wake of a controversial New York state court 
decision allowing defamation claims to proceed against a 
website host.64     
 
 The crux of Amazon’s argument is that Oberdorf’s 
negligence and strict liability claims are barred because she 
seeks to treat Amazon as the publisher or speaker of material 
provided by The Furry Gang, an information content 
                                                 
60 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
61 See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 
1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 2009). 
62 Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citations omitted). 
63 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc). 
64 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 
31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
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provider.65  Amazon contends Oberdorf’s claims are 
essentially that Amazon should be held liable for letting The 
Furry Gang post the offer for the dog collar and for failing to 
police that offer once it was posted.  Oberdorf, on the other 
hand, asserts that her claims do not pertain to Amazon’s role 
in publishing third-party information but rather to its direct 
role in the actual sale and distribution of the defective 
product.  That is true to a point but Oberdorf also contends 
that Amazon should have revised the content provided to 
include warnings to ensure the safe use of the dog collar.  The 
question that we must answer is “Would such an addition to 
the content be part of the editorial function of the Amazon 
website?”   
 
 Courts throughout the country have interpreted the 
CDA safe harbor provision broadly.66  Turning first to our 
Court, in Green v. America Online,67 the plaintiff alleged that 
AOL had failed to properly police its chat rooms to prevent a 
third party from posting defamatory content that caused the 
plaintiff emotional distress.68  We held that the CDA safe 
harbor provision barred the plaintiff’s claims because he was 
“attempt[ing] to hold AOL liable for decisions relating to the 
monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from its 
                                                 
65 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “The term ‘information content 
provider’ means any person or entity that is responsible, in 
whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”  Id. § 230(f)(3). 
66 See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 
(1st Cir. 2016) (collecting federal appellate cases). 
67 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003). 
68 Id. at 469. 
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network—actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s 
role.”69 
 
 Other federal appellate courts have addressed related 
questions.  For example, the First Circuit barred sex 
trafficking claims against a classified advertisement website 
because the allegations centered on the website’s role in 
failing to regulate third-party content that led to the plaintiffs’ 
injuries.70  The Fifth Circuit barred negligence claims alleging 
that an online social network took insufficient precautions to 
prevent a fifteen-year-old teenager from lying about her age, 
thereby leading to her being contacted and sexually 
assaulted.71  The Seventh Circuit barred housing 
discrimination claims against an online message board for 
permitting discriminatory posts.72 
 
 These cases demonstrate that claims are precluded 
whenever “the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant 
violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a 
‘publisher or speaker.’”73  Nonetheless, courts have refused to 
extend the scope of the CDA safe harbor provision “to 
immunize a party’s conduct outside the realm of the Internet 
just because it relates to the publishing of information on the 
                                                 
69 Id. at 471. 
70 Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 
(1st Cir. 2016). 
71 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008). 
72 Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008), as 
amended (May 2, 2008). 
73 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 
2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009). 
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Internet.”74  In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,75 for example, the 
Ninth Circuit barred the plaintiff’s negligence claims against 
Yahoo for failing to remove posts by her ex-boyfriend 
containing nude photographs of her.  However, the court held 
that the CDA safe harbor provision did not immunize Yahoo 
against the plaintiff’s related promissory estoppel claim, 
which was based on Yahoo’s promise to remove the injurious 
content rather than on any editorial function.76    
 
 While we recognize that Amazon exercises online 
editorial functions, we do not agree that all of Oberdorf’s 
claims seek to treat Amazon as the publisher or speaker of 
information provided by another information content 
provider.  As previously discussed, Amazon is a “seller” of 
products on its website, even though the products are sourced 
and shipped by third-party vendors such as The Furry Gang.77  
Amazon’s involvement in transactions extends beyond a mere 
editorial function; it plays a large role in the actual sales 
process.  This includes receiving customer shipping 
information, processing customer payments, relaying funds 
and information to third-party vendors, and collecting the fees 
it charges for providing these services.   
 
 Therefore, to the extent that Oberdorf’s negligence and 
strict liability claims rely on Amazon’s role as an actor in the 
sales process, they are not barred by the CDA.  However, to 
the extent that Oberdorf is alleging that Amazon failed to 
                                                 
74 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1206 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).   
75 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
76 Id. at 1107–09. 
77 See supra Part III.  
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provide or to edit adequate warnings regarding the use of the 
dog collar, we conclude that that activity falls within the 
publisher’s editorial function.  That is, Amazon failed to add 
necessary information to content of the website.  For that 
reason, these failure to warn claims are barred by the CDA.   
 
Because the District Court did not parse Oberdorf’s 
claims in order to distinguish between “failure to warn” 
claims and claims premised on other actions or failures in the 
sales or distribution processes, we will vacate its holding that 
Oberdorf’s claims are barred by the CDA.  To the extent that 
Oberdorf’s claims rely on allegations relating to selling, 
inspecting, marketing, distributing, failing to test, or 
designing, they pertain to Amazon’s direct role in the sales 
and distribution processes and are therefore not barred by the 
CDA safe harbor provision.78  Those claims will be remanded 
to the District Court. 
 
V 
 
 For the above reasons, we hold that (1) Amazon is a 
“seller” for purposes of § 402A of the Second Restatement of 
Torts and thus subject to the Pennsylvania strict products 
liability law, and (2) Oberdorf’s claims against Amazon are 
not barred by § 230 of the CDA except as they rely upon a 
                                                 
78 The Fourth Circuit has similarly held that the CDA does 
not insulate Amazon against claims based on its participation 
in the sale of a defective product.  See Erie Ins. Co., 2019 WL 
2195146, at *3 (“While the Communications Decency Act 
protects interactive computer service providers from 
liability as a publisher of speech, it does not protect them 
from liability as the seller of a defective product.”). 
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“failure to warn” theory of liability.  We will therefore affirm 
the dismissal under the CDA of the failure to warn claims.  
We will vacate the remainder of the judgment of the District 
Court and remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Oberdorf v. Amazon, Inc., No. 18-1041 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
This case implicates an important yet relatively 
uncharted area of law. No Pennsylvania court has yet examined 
the product liability of an online marketplace like Amazon’s 
for sales made by third parties through its platform. Our task, 
as a federal court applying state law, is to predict how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the case. Berrier v. 
Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2009). We must 
take special care “to apply state law and not . . . to participate 
in an effort to change it.” McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 
622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted). In 
my view, well-settled Pennsylvania products liability law 
precludes treating Amazon as a “seller” strictly liable for any 
injuries caused by the defective Furry Gang collar. 
 
The plaintiffs weigh in detail policy reasons for 
allowing them to sue Amazon. Plaintiffs’ theory would 
substantially widen what has previously been a narrow 
exception to the typical rule for identifying products liability 
defendants sufficiently within the chain of distribution. A 
“seller” in Pennsylvania is almost always an actor who 
transfers ownership from itself to the customer, something 
Amazon does not do for Marketplace sellers like The Furry 
Gang.1 For similar reasons, every court to consider the question 
thus far has found Amazon Marketplace not a “seller” for 
                                              
1  For purposes of this opinion, “ownership” includes, in 
addition to legal title, other rights to possess such as lease and 
bailment. 
 
2 
products liability or other purposes; several of those courts 
have done so under products liability regimes similar to 
Pennsylvania’s.2 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from 
                                              
2  For determination under Restatement-derived common 
law definition of “seller,” see Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 141–42 (4th Cir. May 22, 2019) (under 
Maryland common law of products liability, Amazon was not 
a seller of a third-party seller’s product because it never held 
title to the product); Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., --- F. Supp. 
3d ---, 2019 WL 1437877, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2019) 
(under Illinois common law, Amazon Marketplace was not 
within the “chain of distribution” of a third-party seller’s 
product, nor did it “play an integral role in the marketing 
enterprise” such that policy considerations would justify 
extending liability outside the chain of distribution) (internal 
citations omitted); Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 
3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (under New York common law, 
Amazon Marketplace was not a seller because it was not within 
the product’s “chain of distribution”). For determination under 
state common law doctrine and under state statutes whose 
definitions of “seller” are inconclusive, requiring consideration 
of common law principles, see Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., --- 
F.3d ---, 2019 WL 2417391, at *7 (6th Cir. June 10, 2019) 
(interpreting ambiguously defined Tennessee statutory term 
“seller” to include “any individual regularly engaged in 
exercising sufficient control over a product in connection with 
its sale, lease, or bailment, for livelihood or gain” but holding 
Amazon Marketplace did not meet this definition); Carpenter 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-3221, 2019 WL 1259158, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019) (under California law, Amazon 
Marketplace was not subject to strict liability because it was 
 
3 
the majority’s disposition of the claims not barred by the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). 
 
I. 
Amazon is a multinational technology company. 
Among other ventures, it hosts online sales. Products are 
offered for sale at Amazon.com in three primary ways. First, 
                                              
not “integral to the business enterprise and a necessary factor 
in bringing the product to market”); Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at *6–7 
(D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (Amazon Marketplace was not a seller 
under New Jersey statutory definition encompassing “any 
person who, in the course of business conducted for that 
purpose: sells . . . or otherwise is involved in placing a product 
in the line of commerce”) (internal citation omitted); Stiner v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 120 N.E.3d 885, 891 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) 
(Amazon Marketplace was not a seller under Ohio statutory 
definition encompassing “[a] person that, in the course of a 
business conducted for the purpose, sells . . . or otherwise 
participates in the placing of a product in the stream of 
commerce”) (internal citation omitted); see also Milo & Gabby 
LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879, 885 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (Amazon Marketplace was not a “seller” under the 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106); McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA, 
Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 541–42 (D. Md. 2016) (dismissing 
a Maryland-law negligence claim against Amazon); Inman v. 
Technicolor USA, Inc., No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at *6 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) (holding, under Pennsylvania 
products liability law, eBay was not a “seller” because eBay 
was not “anything more than an online forum where sellers . . 
. may peddle their wares to buyers”).  
4 
Amazon sources, sells, and ships some products as seller of its 
own goods. Second, third-party sellers sell products through 
Amazon Marketplace “fulfilled by Amazon,” purchasing 
Amazon’s services in storing and shipping their products. 
Third, at issue here, third-party sellers sell products through 
Amazon Marketplace without additional “fulfillment” 
services. These sellers, like The Furry Gang, supply and ship 
products directly to consumers without ever placing the items 
in Amazon’s possession.  
 
 Amazon Marketplace has grown enormously in recent 
years. Over a million businesses of all sizes sell products on 
Amazon Marketplace, according to Amazon’s own figures, 
and “small and medium-sized businesses selling in Amazon’s 
stores now account for 58 percent of [Amazon’s] sales.” 
Amazon, 2019 Amazon SMB Impact Report 1, 3, 
https://d39w7f4ix9f5s9.cloudfront.net/61/3b/1f0c2cd24f37b
d0e3794c284cd2f/2019-amazon-smb-impact-report.pdf (last 
accessed June 17, 2019). These businesses and their products 
are diverse: a recent profile of highly successful Amazon 
Marketplace sellers included businesses offering beauty 
products, indoor gardening kits, and an educational toy 
teaching coding. Kiri Masters, 4 Companies Founded By 
Millennials That Are Making Millions on Amazon, Forbes 
(Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kirimasters/ 
2018/08/09/4-companies-founded-by-millennials-who-are-
selling-millions-on-amazon. Amazon Marketplace and other 
online platforms give consumers the ability to buy from small 
and large businesses whose products they may never have 
encountered in an ordinary physical store.  
 
Amazon envisions its Marketplace as an open one. It 
reserves the right to remove sellers’ listings or terminate 
5 
Marketplace services for any reason and requires sellers to 
represent they are in good legal standing, but it does not apply 
a general vetting process to all sellers to identify those who do 
not in fact meet that standard. Amazon also does not narrow 
the Marketplace’s offerings by limiting the number of sellers 
who may offer each type of product: any number of sellers may 
register. In displaying products to customers, Amazon 
distinguishes products sold through the Marketplace from 
those sold directly by Amazon, identifying the seller 
responsible for the item in a “sold by” line placed prominently 
next to the price and shipping information. App. 211. The 
seller’s name also appears on the order confirmation page, 
before the customer clicks “place your order” to finalize the 
purchase. Id. Amazon’s conditions of use for customers affirm 
the distinction, explaining, in Amazon Marketplace purchases 
from third-party sellers, “you are purchasing directly from 
those third parties, not from Amazon. We are not responsible 
for examining or evaluating, and we do not warrant, the 
offerings of any of these businesses or individuals.” Appellee’s 
Br. 4 (citing Amazon, Conditions of Use, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html/ref=footer %20cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 (last 
updated May 21, 2018)).  
 
A customer on Amazon Marketplace buys a product 
that has been chosen, sourced, and priced by the third-party 
seller. The seller contractually commits to “ensure that [it is] 
the seller of each of [its] Products” listed for sale. App. 164. In 
exchange for Amazon’s services including listing the product 
and managing payments, the seller is charged a monthly fee, as 
well as a referral fee of a percentage of each sale made. The 
relationship reflected in the agreement between Amazon and 
the seller is one of “independent contractors.” Id. at 270. The 
6 
agreement specifically disclaims other potential relationships: 
it does not mean to create relationships of “partnership, joint 
venture, agency, franchise, sales representative, or 
employment,” nor does it create an “exclusive relationship” 
constraining either Amazon or the third-party seller from other 
sales relationships. Id.  
 
For each new listing a seller creates, the seller identifies 
the product it plans to sell, designates a price, and writes a 
product description. Amazon requires the description include 
certain minimum information about the product, and requires 
the seller to offer a price as favorable as the one it offers in any 
other sales channels. Amazon also automatically formats the 
information provided into a product listing page matching 
others on the Marketplace, and it sometimes modifies listings 
to streamline user experience: for example, by grouping 
together the pages of multiple sellers who offer the identical 
product sourced in different ways. The seller may choose to 
offer, or not to offer, a warranty on its product. Regardless, the 
agreement makes the seller “responsible for any 
nonconformity or defect in, or any public or private recall of, 
any of [its] products.” Id. at 173.  
 
II. 
When a product is sold on Amazon Marketplace, the 
third-party seller offering the product for sale, as well as the 
product’s original manufacturer, may each be sued in product 
liability if the product is defective. This case raises the question 
whether Amazon, too, can be liable as a “seller” of such a 
product, because of the assistance it gives to the third-party 
seller that provided the product to the customer. Plaintiffs 
answer this question in part by invoking a set of four policy 
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factors laid out in Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 
736, 739 (Pa. 1977). For the reasons I discuss in Part III, the 
Francioni factors should come second to an analysis under 
Pennsylvania law of the defendant’s role in supplying the 
product. See Cafazzo v. Cent. Med. Health Servs., 668 A.2d 
521, 523 (Pa. 1995). I begin, instead, with the definition of 
“seller” under Pennsylvania law. 
 
A. 
A seller under Pennsylvania product liability law is one 
“engaged in the business of selling . . . a product.” Id. at 523 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1)(a) (Am. 
Law Inst. 1965)). In nearly all cases, “selling” entails 
something Amazon does not do for Marketplace products: 
transferring ownership, or a different kind of legal right to 
possession, from the seller to the customer. Thus, in 
Pennsylvania, sellers include traditional wholesalers and 
retailers, as well as those who supply a product through a 
transaction other than a sale. See, e.g., Chelton v. Keystone 
Oilfield Supply Co., 777 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (W.D. Pa. 1991) 
(wholesaler); Burch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 467 A.2d 615, 
618 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (retailer); Francioni, 372 A.2d at 
739–40 (lessor); Villari v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 
727, 730–31 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (pest control company supplying 
insecticide as part of service). Though varied, each of these 
cases holds liable a “seller” who transferred the right to possess 
the product from itself to the customer. 
 
 Transfer of a right to possession is so typical to 
“sellers” that exceptions are rare. There is one primary 
exception in Pennsylvania caselaw: the “manufacturer’s 
representative.” See Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 452 
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A.2d 1349, 1351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Hoffman reversed a 
grant of summary judgment for the defendant and held a 
“manufacturer’s representative” could be strictly liable. Id. at 
1354–55. A manufacturer’s representative, also termed “sales 
agent” or “manufacturer’s agent,” is a salesperson who helps a 
manufacturer expand sales by representing a product, usually 
in a particular region for a period of time, promoting the 
product to retailers or directly to customers.3 After evaluating 
this uniquely involved retail role, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania concluded it was much more than “tangential,” 
and the sales agent could be held liable as a seller. Id. at 1354.  
 
But in no other scenario has a Pennsylvania court 
imposed “seller” liability on a defendant whose role in the sale 
did not include transferring ownership or possession of the 
product. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
considered and rejected “seller” liability for an auctioneer who 
“never owned, operated or controlled the equipment which was 
to be auctioned.” Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 
279, 279 (Pa. 1989). As the court explained, in auctioning off 
a product owned and controlled by the third-party seller, “[t]he 
                                              
3  See A Dictionary of Business and Management 377 
(Jonathan Law ed., 6th ed. 2016) (defining “manufacturer’s 
agent” as “[a] commission agent who usually has a franchise 
to sell a particular manufacturer’s products in a particular 
country or region for a given period”); Charles Cohon, Top 
Considerations When Hiring Manufacturers’ Reps, 
Manufacturers’ Agents National Association, 
http://www.manaonline.org/manufacturers/topconsiderations-
when-hiring-manufacturers-reps (last visited May 9, 2019) 
(describing manufacturer’s representatives as a kind of 
“outsource[d] . . . sales force”). 
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auction company merely provided a market as the agent of the 
seller. . . . Selection of the products was accomplished by the 
bidders, on their own initiative and without warranties by the 
auction company.” Id. at 282. The auction company’s 
significant role in assisting the sale was nonetheless 
“tangential” to the core of the transaction, the exchange 
between the buyer and third-party seller. Id. Similarly 
“tangential” was the role of the financer of a sale, who, 
although technically temporary owner and lessor of the 
supplied product, participated only by “offering the use of 
money.” Nath v. Nat’l Equip. Leasing Corp., 439 A.2d 633, 
636 (Pa. 1981) (quoting Francioni, 372 A.2d at 740 n.3). 
Pennsylvania courts would not hold liable as sellers such 
tangential actors as shopping malls renting space to retailers, 
credit card companies that enable sales transactions, or 
newspapers or websites hosting classified ads. See generally 3 
Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Torts § 41:61 (2d ed. 1998). 
 
Amazon Marketplace, like the auctioneer in Musser, 
takes an important part in assisting sales, but is “tangential” to 
the actual exchange between customer and third-party seller. 
562 A.2d at 282. Like an auctioneer, Amazon Marketplace 
provides the “means of marketing” to a third-party seller who 
accomplished the “fact of marketing” when it “chose the 
products and exposed them for sale.” Id. (citing Francioni, 372 
A.2d at 738). Amazon Marketplace’s services to any individual 
seller for an individual product are not “undertaken 
specifically,” but rather, as with the auctioneer, provided on 
essentially similar terms to a large catalogue of sellers. Id.; see 
id. at 282 n.3. And like an auctioneer, Amazon Marketplace 
never owns, operates, or controls the product when it assists in 
a sale. See id. at 279. 
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Amazon Marketplace’s similarities to the auctioneer 
emphasize it has little in common with Hoffman’s 
manufacturer’s representative, the only kind of “seller” held 
liable despite not having made a transfer of ownership or 
possession rights. Hoffman, 452 A.2d at 1354. Amazon 
Marketplace does not offer the co-strategizing relationship 
promised by manufacturers’ representatives. Amazon 
Marketplace is not an outsourced sales force working with 
individual manufacturers to boost sales: it offers a marketing 
platform, and it is up to the third-party seller to make best use 
of the platform to maximize sales.  
 
Under Pennsylvania law, then, Amazon was not the 
seller of The Furry Gang’s product and therefore is not liable 
for any product defect. Because established Pennsylvania law 
precludes holding Amazon strictly liable here, I respectfully 
dissent.  
 
B. 
While Pennsylvania law alone dictates this outcome, it 
is reinforced by “analogous decisions” and “other reliable 
data.” McKenna, 622 F.2d at 663. Pennsylvania courts have yet 
to consider whether Amazon is strictly liable for defective 
products sold through its Marketplace. So just like a 
Pennsylvania court would, I consider relevant decisions from 
other jurisdictions. These sources, including two federal 
appellate decisions so far, confirm what Pennsylvania law 
already makes clear. Amazon’s role in assisting a product’s 
sale does not make it that product’s “seller.” 
 
The Sixth Circuit found Amazon Marketplace was not 
a “seller” after consulting a variety of sources to clarify the 
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term’s expansive but ambiguous meaning within the Tennessee 
Products Liability Act. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., --- F.3d ---, 
2019 WL 2417391, at *5–7 (6th Cir. June 10, 2019). The 
Tennessee statute defines “seller” as “any individual or entity 
engaged in the business of selling a product,” including a 
“retailer,” “wholesaler,” “distributor,” “lessor,” or “bailor.” 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(7) (West 2012). Considering 
and rejecting a more “limited construction” proposed by 
Amazon, Fox, 2019 WL 2417391, at *5, the court interpreted 
this definition to include not only those who transfer title, but 
“any individual regularly engaged in exercising sufficient 
control over a product in connection with its sale, lease, or 
bailment, for livelihood or gain,” id. at *7. The court 
nonetheless found Amazon Marketplace did not fall within 
even this more expansive definition. The court held Amazon 
did not exercise sufficient control to be the product’s “seller” 
because Amazon “did not choose to offer the [product] for sale, 
did not set the price of the [product], and did not make any 
representations about the safety or specifications of the 
[product] on its marketplace.” Id. at *7. It noted that, as in this 
case, Amazon did not fulfill the product and therefore never 
possessed it or shipped it to the customer. Id. 
 
Even where Amazon Marketplace did fulfill the product 
at issue, the Fourth Circuit held Amazon was not the product’s 
“seller” under Maryland common law. Erie Ins. Co. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 144 (4th Cir. May 22, 2019).4 
                                              
4  In Maryland, as in Pennsylvania, product liability is 
governed by common law. See Maryland State Bar 
Association, Maryland Product Liability Law § 1.1 (2d ed. 
2003). Contrary to the majority’s characterization, the court’s 
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In that case, unlike this one, Amazon “fulfilled” the product by 
storing it prior to sale then shipping it to the customer. The 
court held Amazon Marketplace was not a seller because, 
despite its role in “fulfilling” the sale, it never performed the 
basic act of sale: it did not “transfer title to purchasers of [the 
product] for a price.” Id. at 141. The court explained, relying 
in part on Pennsylvania precedent, those who “own . . . the 
products during the chain of distribution are sellers,” while 
those who “render services to facilitate that distribution or 
sale[] are not sellers.” Id. (citing Musser, 562 A.2d at 283). 
Amazon, because it only rendered services and did not transfer 
ownership, was not a seller. Id. at 144.5 Here, Amazon played 
an even more limited role: it neither stored nor shipped the 
product. 
Other federal courts have reached the same outcome. 
Courts have declined to treat Amazon Marketplace as a “sales 
agent,” as plaintiffs ask us to do. In dismissing a products 
liability lawsuit against Amazon essentially identical to this 
                                              
decision in Erie did not turn on a Maryland statute, but rather 
consulted a potentially analogous statutory provision alongside 
other sources including dictionary definitions and out-of-state 
persuasive authority to infer the common law meaning of 
“seller.” 925 F.3d at 141. 
5  Maryland differs from Pennsylvania in declining to hold 
liable those who transfer possession through a transaction other 
than a sale, such as lessors and bailors. See Maryland Product 
Liability Law § 4.8. For that reason, the Erie court defined 
“sellers” as transferors of title and did not discuss transfer of 
another kind of right to possess the product. 925 F.3d at 141. 
Because no such non-sale transaction is at issue in this case, 
however, Maryland and Pennsylvania law are analogous, and 
Erie’s analysis is informative. 
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one, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
considered a New York case that, like Pennsylvania’s Hoffman 
decision, held a sales agent liable as a “seller.” Eberhart v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398–99 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (citing Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 547 N.Y.S.2d 699, 
700–01 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1989)); see Hoffman, 452 A.2d at 
1354. The court found Brumbaugh exceptional and of no help 
in establishing liability against Amazon. Eberhart, 325 F. 
Supp. 3d at 398–99. It reasoned, among New York cases 
holding defendants liable as sellers, “the vast majority of 
opinions” involve a defendant who did “at some point, own the 
defective product.” Id. at 398. And while Brumbaugh’s sales 
agent, given its exclusive role in connecting the manufacturer 
with local distributors, was “a mandatory link in [the] 
distributive chain,” id. at 399 (quoting Brumbaugh, 547 
N.Y.S.2d at 701), the court found Amazon Marketplace’s role 
in merely “facilitating purchases” did not rise to this level. Id.  
 
The Northern District of Illinois adopted similar 
reasoning in rejecting Amazon’s liability. Garber v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2019 WL 1437877, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2019). The court identified and analyzed the 
few Illinois cases in which parties who never owned the 
product were nonetheless held liable. It found Amazon 
Marketplace resembled neither a manufacturer’s 
representative, nor a broker who made direct agreements with 
customers to sell the product and held exclusive rights to do so. 
Id. at *7–9 (discussing Hammond v. N. Am. Asbestos Corp., 
454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Ill. 1983), and Bittler v. White & Co., 
560 N.E.2d 979, 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)). Amazon was not 
liable for third-party sales because “[the third-party seller], not 
Amazon, owned the [product], sourced it and listed it for sale 
on Amazon’s marketplace, and sold and shipped it directly to 
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the [customers].” Id. at *7. Moreover, unlike the more involved 
defendants held to be sellers, Amazon’s “‘major role’ was 
providing a venue and marketplace for third-party sellers . . . 
to connect with buyers.” Id. at 8.6 This consensus among courts 
analyzing common law analogous to Pennsylvania’s confirms 
that Amazon’s limited role in Marketplace sales does not make 
it a “seller” liable for defective products. 
 
The Third Restatement of Torts’ § 20, defining “seller,” 
captures state law trends in Pennsylvania, common also to New 
York, Illinois, and other states, as federal courts considering 
product liability suits against Amazon Marketplace have noted. 
See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 20 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1998); see also, e.g., Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 398 & 
n.4 (finding its conclusion against product liability for Amazon 
Marketplace “reinforced” by § 20, though New York had not 
adopted the provision). Although the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has not yet had occasion to consider § 20, the 
provision’s incremental clarification of existing law, fully 
consistent with Pennsylvania case law, is the kind of guidance 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would likely find 
informative. 
                                              
6  See also Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 
17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at *5–12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) 
(Amazon Marketplace did not resemble a broker who 
exercised control over a product by taking title to it; it instead 
resembled a broker who never exercised control and was thus 
not a “seller”); Stiner v. Amazon.com Inc., 120 N.E.3d 885, 892 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (distinguishing Amazon Marketplace 
from the consignee who took possession of an item before 
putting it up for auction; Amazon Marketplace more closely 
resembled the auctioneer and was thus not a “seller”). 
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 In explaining the parameters of seller liability, § 20 
reinforces and builds on the Second Restatement’s analogous 
definition. Under the Second Restatement, a seller is one who 
is “engaged in the business of selling products for use or 
consumption.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. f. 
This definition distinguishes the non-liable occasional seller 
from the liable regular seller, but it offers no help in 
determining what kind of involvement in a sale might be 
considered selling. The Third Restatement analyzes 
intervening case law to specify that a seller is one who 
“transfers ownership . . . either for use or consumption,” or, 
alternately, one who “otherwise distributes a product” by 
providing that product “in a commercial transaction other than 
a sale.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 20.7 
Amazon Marketplace does not transfer ownership of third-
party products, so it is not a seller. In its commentary, the Third 
Restatement also addresses the situation of businesses 
participating in a sale who do not themselves do the work of 
transferring title. These actors are “product distribution 
facilitators,” meaning those “[p]ersons assisting or providing 
services to product distributors, while indirectly facilitating the 
commercial distribution of products.” Id. cmt. g. In general, 
product distribution facilitators are not liable as sellers. Id. 
                                              
7  In defining “one who otherwise distributes a product,” 
the provision further specifies, “[c]ommercial nonsale product 
distributors include, but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, and 
those who provide products to others as a means of promoting 
either the use or consumption of such products or some other 
commercial activity.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. 
Liab. § 20. No such nonsale distributor is at issue in this case 
because the relevant transaction was a sale. 
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reporter’s note g (citing Musser, 562 A.2d at 283). Amazon 
Marketplace fits the description of a product distribution 
facilitator, so it would not qualify as a seller. 
 
The Third Restatement includes the Hoffman exception 
to the general rule for product distribution facilitators: 
exclusive sales representatives or exclusive agents are often 
considered sellers because the agent “trafficks intimately in 
[the products],” Brumbaugh, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 701, and is 
“bound by its exclusive sales representative contract . . . to 
promote the sale of [the] products,” Bittler, 560 N.E.2d at 982. 
See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 20 reporter’s 
note g; see also Hoffman, 452 A.2d at 1354. Moreover, where 
the agent’s franchise to sell the product is exclusive, meaning 
the agent is entitled to coordinate all sales of the product for a 
period of time in a particular region, then the agent is “a 
mandatory link in [the] distributive chain,” cementing the 
rationale for its liability. Brumbaugh, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 701.8 As 
noted, see supra pp. 8–9, Amazon Marketplace clearly does 
not fit this description.  
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in Tincher 
v. Omego Flex, Inc. that it would “adopt[] . . . sections of a 
restatement . . . if the cause of action and its contours are 
consistent with the nature of the tort and Pennsylvania’s 
traditional common law formulation.” 104 A.3d 328, 354 (Pa. 
                                              
8  “Exclusive” sales agents may represent a variety of 
products; they are exclusive agents for a particular product if 
they obtain exclusive rights from a manufacturer to sell the 
product for a period of time in a designated region. See, e.g., 
Brumbaugh, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
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2014) (internal quotation mark omitted).9 Pennsylvania’s 
                                              
9  See also Walnut St. Assocs., Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, 
Inc., 20 A.3d 468, 479 (Pa. 2011) (adopting the Second 
Restatement of Torts § 772 because “the formulation is 
consistent with the very nature of the tort, and with 
Pennsylvania law”); Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. 
Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 285 (Pa. 2005) (adopting 
the Second Restatement of Torts § 552, because the provision 
“is consistent with Pennsylvania’s traditional common law 
formulation of the tort”); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 
1966) (adopting the Second Restatement of Torts § 402A).  
 
By contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained 
it would not adopt sections of a restatement “unmoored from 
existing common law” and whose adoption would “produce 
such a policy shift that it amounts in actuality or public 
perception to a derogation of legislative authority.” Tincher, 
104 A.3d at 354. On these grounds, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court declined to adopt certain provisions of the Third 
Restatement of Torts that did not meet this standard because 
those provisions made a major revision to the traditional strict 
liability standard. Specifically, the provisions in question 
instituted a new requirement for design defect cases, requiring 
plaintiffs show the existence of a reasonable alternative safer 
design, rather than treating alternative design as one non-
determinative factor among others. Id. at 346, 393–94 
(discussing the Third Restatement of Torts: Products Liability 
§ 2(b) and related provisions, §§ 1 through 7, implementing the 
alternative design element). The court found these provisions 
an “inaccurate” representation of existing Pennsylvania law 
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approach is to evaluate “sections of a restatement” rather than 
adopting or rejecting the entire document. Id. at 339. In 
excluding most sales facilitators from products liability but 
making an exception for sales agents, Pennsylvania case law 
matches § 20 of the Third Restatement, meeting Tincher’s 
standard. Under Pennsylvania law, as in § 20, an actor who 
assists a sale, but does not directly transfer ownership or 
possession, is in nearly all cases not a “seller” of the product. 
Compare 3 Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Torts § 41:60–61, with 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 20 reporter’s note 
g. Under Pennsylvania law, as in § 20, one kind of sales 
facilitator may nonetheless be a “seller”: a sales agent, who 
personally represents the manufacturer in advocating for the 
product’s sale, and may have an exclusive right to facilitate the 
product’s sale for a period of time within a geographic area. 
Hoffman, 452 A.2d at 1354–55; Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
                                              
and believed them in potential conflict with important “general 
principles” of Pennsylvania products liability. Id. at 399, 397.  
 
While the provisions rejected in Tincher departed 
significantly from the Second Restatement and from state law 
developed in its framework, as observers note, other 
“provisions of the Restatement Third simply do as promised; 
they restate the current law.” Vicki MacDougall, The Impact 
of the Restatement (Third), Torts: Products Liability (1998) on 
Product Liability Law, 6 Consumer Fin. L. Q. R. 105, 106 
(2008). Provisions more modest than those rejected therefore 
may in some instances fulfill the intended purpose of 
Restatement guidance in Pennsylvania law: not “supplanting” 
Pennsylvania’s “traditional approach” but “rather . . . 
clarifying the contours of the tort.” Bilt-Rite, 866 A.2d at 287. 
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Prod. Liab. § 20 reporter’s note g. Because § 20 is “consistent 
with the nature of the tort and Pennsylvania’s traditional 
common law formulation,” it is likely the provision would 
inform the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
question at issue in this case. Tincher, 104 A.3d at 354. 
 
In Pennsylvania, as in states across the country 
including New York and Illinois, a business assisting a sale is 
not a “seller” for products liability purposes unless it takes on 
the particularly involved retail relationship of sales 
agent/manufacturer’s representative.10 The Third 
Restatement’s § 20 tracks this pattern. Like every federal court 
to consider this issue so far, I would find Amazon Marketplace 
not a seller. 
 
III. 
 To deem Amazon a “seller” of Marketplace products, 
plaintiffs rely in large part on a four-factor policy test first 
articulated in Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 
736, 739 (Pa. 1977). More recently, though, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has clarified the Francioni test’s purpose and 
limited applicability, making it evident the test has no role in 
                                              
10  In Hoffman, the court did not discuss whether the sales 
agent at issue had an exclusive franchise to sell within a 
particular territory or a nonexclusive franchise. See 452 A.2d 
at 1351. Hoffman, then, is consistent with cases requiring 
exclusivity to hold sales agents liable but does not create such 
a requirement itself. Regardless, for the reasons discussed 
above, see supra pp. 8–9, Amazon does not resemble a sales 
agent with either an exclusive or a nonexclusive franchise to 
market products. 
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answering the question at issue here. See Cafazzo v. Cent. Med. 
Health Servs., 668 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. 1995). 
 
A. 
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, the 
Francioni test guides “whether a particular supplier of 
products, whose status as a supplier is already determined, is 
to be held liable for damages caused by defects in the products 
supplied.” Id. at 525. Cafazzo makes clear the Francioni test 
should not be used to determine whether, in the first place, a 
particular defendant is a supplier of the product: that question 
is a “precondition necessary for application of this analysis.” 
Id. That question must be answered by considering “what is 
being done” by the defendant, and whether the activity 
constitutes supplying products. Id. at 524. 
 
No one disputed that the Francioni defendant, who was 
a lessor of hauling equipment, had supplied the equipment that 
caused the plaintiff’s injury. 372 A.2d at 737. The issue, 
instead, was whether supplying equipment via a lease made the 
defendant a “seller,” even though the transaction was not 
technically a sale. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
identified four policy factors which, in other jurisdictions, had 
served to justify including lessors as “sellers” for products 
liability purposes:  
 
(1) In some instances the lessor, like the seller, 
may be the only member of the marketing chain 
available to the injured plaintiff for redress; (2) 
As in the case of the seller, imposition of strict 
liability upon the lessor serves as an incentive to 
safety; (3) The lessor will be in a better position 
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than the consumer to prevent the circulation of 
defective products; and (4) The lessor can 
distribute the cost of compensating for injuries 
resulting from defects by charging for it in his 
business, [i].e., by adjustment of the rental terms. 
 
Id. at 739.  
Because the equipment leasing company was in the 
business of supplying products via lease, and because of the 
four identified policy factors, the court held the equipment 
leasing company should be considered a “seller.” Id. at 739–
40. Similarly, though reaching the opposite outcome, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the Francioni test to a 
pharmacy defendant, holding, although the pharmacy had 
supplied drugs to patients, policy factors would counsel against 
imposing strict product liability on the pharmacy. Coyle v. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1991).  
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also cited the 
Francioni test as additional support for its holding, after 
determining that a potential defendant was not a “supplier.” 
See Musser, 562 A.2d at 281; Nath, 439 A.2d at 634. In each 
case, the court analyzed the activities of the defendant, and 
found them too “tangential” to the actual sale of the product to 
support seller liability. Musser, 562 A.2d at 282; Nath, 439 
A.2d at 636. The court then applied the Francioni factors and 
found, in each case, policy considerations did not support seller 
liability, either. Musser, 562 A.2d at 282–83; Nath, 439 A.2d 
at 635–36.  
 
Cafazzo clarifies the relationship between the two 
holdings present in each of these cases, establishing that policy 
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factors alone cannot create seller liability. In Cafazzo, the court 
held a hospital and physician were not suppliers of a medical 
device they provided to a patient, accompanied by a surcharge 
for the device, because “the relationship of hospital and/or 
doctor to patients is not dictated by the distribution of such 
products, even if there is some surcharge on the price of the 
product.” 668 A.2d at 524. 
 
As Cafazzo makes evident, once a court has determined 
a defendant is too “tangential” to be considered a supplier of 
the product at issue, applying the Francioni policy factors is 
unnecessary. Id. at 523–24. Courts may nonetheless discuss 
them in order to demonstrate that, “even assuming that [the 
defendants] could reasonably be termed sellers . . . the policy 
reasons for strict liability are not present.” Id. at 525. For the 
reasons already discussed, Amazon Marketplace is too 
tangential to third-party sales of products to be considered a 
supplier or seller of those products under Pennsylvania law. 
The Francioni policy factors therefore cannot establish seller 
liability.  
 
B. 
Even if Amazon Marketplace could be considered a 
supplier, application of the Francioni factors would not result 
in liability. Indeed, the policy outcomes produced by liability 
for Amazon Marketplace closely resemble those produced by 
liability for an auctioneer, as in Musser. See 562 A.2d at 282–
83. Thus, for reasons very similar to those identified in Musser, 
the Francioni policy factors do not support strict product 
liability for Amazon Marketplace.  
The first factor, availability of other members of the 
distribution chain, weighs in Amazon’s favor, just as in 
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Musser. The Musser court found the first factor did not support 
liability for the auctioneer because, “in an auction there is a 
seller, who is served by the auctioneer.” Id. at 282 (footnote 
omitted). Whereas in Francioni, the defendant lessor leased the 
product directly to the customer and the court identified no 
other member of the marketing chain, see 372 A.2d at 739, all 
Amazon Marketplace products are sold by third-party sellers 
who are available to be sued. That seller may be defunct, 
insolvent, or impossible to locate by the time of suit, just as the 
seller of an auctioned product may be. But as the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court noted in applying this factor, “[t]o assign 
liability for no reason other than the ability to pay damages is 
inconsistent with our jurisprudence.” Cafazzo, 668 A.2d at 
526.11  
 
The second two factors, the potential incentive to safety 
and the defendant’s relative ability to prevent circulation of the 
products, weigh in favor of Amazon, as they did in Musser. In 
Musser, the court considered the auctioneer’s current business 
model, finding the auctioneer was “not in the business of 
designing and/or manufacturing any particular product,” nor 
did the auctioneer attempt to create the kind of “ongoing 
relationship” with any of its large catalogue of sellers “which 
might equip the auctioneer to influence the manufacturing 
process.” 562 A.2d at 282. The auctioneer was not the kind of 
seller who makes it “his business to know the product he sells.” 
Id. at 283. Similarly, Amazon Marketplace is “not in the 
                                              
11  As Musser makes clear, the relevant question is whether 
alternate legally responsible members of the distribution chain 
exist, not whether the other members are solvent and able to 
pay. See 562 A.2d at 282. 
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business” of choosing, monitoring, or influencing third-party 
sellers’ products or their manufacturing processes. Id.12 Rather, 
the current model of Amazon Marketplace is an open one. All 
sellers meeting Amazon’s terms may offer their products, and 
the same general terms apply to all. Although Amazon reserves 
the right to eject sellers, the company does not undertake to 
curate its selection of products, nor generally to police them for 
dangerousness. As it operates now, Amazon Marketplace does 
not exercise, relative to the consumer, any greater “influence 
in the manufacture of safer products.” Id. Though it is possible 
to envision, as plaintiffs do, a new model for Amazon 
Marketplace in which the company researches products for 
potential defects and polices sellers to ensure they do not offer 
them, such a model would be fundamentally different from the 
Amazon Marketplace that exists now. Indeed, nearly any sales 
facilitator, including an auctioneer, could transform itself by 
creating a system to research sellers, and excluding those 
deemed unfit, instead of serving all comers meeting its terms. 
This kind of transformation, though, would have costs as well 
as benefits, for small entrepreneurs who might be excluded as 
too risky, and for consumers whose access to all goods would 
likely be reduced with greater scrutiny of sellers. Under 
Musser, Pennsylvania products liability law does not demand 
a sales facilitator enter a fundamentally new business model 
simply because it could. 
                                              
12  The majority argues third-party sellers are in a poor 
position to monitor product dangerousness, because they 
communicate with customers through Amazon Marketplace’s 
platform and receive access to customer ratings of their 
products which are also made public. But it is not clear what 
obstacle the Marketplace platform’s collation and formatting 
would present to sellers monitoring customer feedback. 
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Just as in Musser, the final factor, Amazon’s ability to 
pass on the costs of product liability suits by charging all sellers 
more, is the only one weighing in favor of imposing liability. 
But because a variety of market participants could take on this 
insurer role if they chose, even if only peripherally involved in 
the sale, the fourth factor is not determinative. As the Musser 
court explained, where the other three policy factors are not 
present, imposing strict liability “would be related to the 
purpose of the policy considerations underlying the [Second 
Restatement of Torts § 402A] only marginally.” Id.  
 
Because Amazon Marketplace is not a “supplier” of 
third-party products, our inquiry must end there under Cafazzo. 
668 A.2d at 525. Even were we to apply the Francioni policy 
test, though, its four policy factors also counsel against 
liability. 
 
IV. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion as to plaintiffs’ products liability claims not 
barred by § 230 of the CDA and would affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of those claims.13 
                                              
13  I concur in the majority’s thoughtful analysis of the 
CDA’s application to plaintiffs’ claims. 
